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1 
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
& CONCESSION THEORY 
STEFAN J. PADFIELD* 
ABSTRACT 
This Essay examines three related propositions: (1) Voluntary corpo-
rate social responsibility (CSR) fails to effectively advance the agenda of a 
meaningful segment of CSR proponents; (2) None of the three dominant 
corporate governance theories—director primacy, shareholder primacy, 
or team production theory—support mandatory CSR as a normative matter; 
and, (3) Corporate personality theory, specifically concession theory, can 
be a meaningful source of leverage in advancing mandatory CSR in the 
face of opposition from the three primary corporate governance theories. 
In examining these propositions, this Essay makes the additional claims 
that Citizens United: (A) supports the proposition that corporate person-
ality theory matters; (B) undermines one of the key supports of the share-
holder wealth maximization norm; and (C) highlights the political nature 
of this debate. Finally, I note that the Supreme Court’s recent Hobby Lobby 
decision does not undermine my CSR claims, contrary to the suggestions 
of some commentators. 
  
                                                                                                                         
* Professor, University of Akron School of Law (B.A., Brown University; J.D., Uni-
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Any model that commands the loyalty of one or more generations of 
scholars doubtless has more than a grain of truth.1 
 
[P]ublic opinion ... ultimately makes law ....2 
INTRODUCTION 
This Essay was written in response to an invitation to participate in a 
“Conference and Micro-Symposium on Competing Theories of Corporate 
Governance”? sponsored by the Lowell Milken Institute for Business Law 
and Policy at the UCLA School of Law (the “Symposium”).3 The particu-
lar theories of corporate governance under consideration were director 
primacy, shareholder primacy, and team production. Invitees were asked 
to “define the competing models, critique them, and explore their implica-
tions for various important legal doctrines.”4 Specifically, I was asked by 
Stephen Bainbridge to participate as part of a panel on the “Implications 
for Corporate Purpose,”? which was to “explore whether the competing 
models have descriptively accurate and normatively appealing implica-
tions for the corporate purpose (a.k.a., stakeholder or corporate social 
responsibility) debate.”5 As will be explained in more detail below, my 
answer to the first part of this question is that the director primacy and 
team production models appear to have descriptively accurate implications 
for corporate purpose, at least from the perspective of the current corpo-
rate law status quo, because they both locate control within the board of 
directors, and neither requires a shift from shareholder wealth maximiza-
tion to stakeholder primacy or corporate social responsibility (CSR) as the 
goal of control.6 However, I argue that all three of the primary models of 
                                                                                                                         
1 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Gov-
ernance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 550 (2003). 
2 E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. 
REV. 1145, 1148 (1932). 
3 Letter from Stephen Bainbridge, William D. Warren Distinguished Professor of 
Law, UCLA School of Law (June 3, 2013) (on file with author) [hereinafter Bainbridge 
Letter]. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 I note that many commentators and judges use “shareholder primacy”? when they 
likely mean “shareholder wealth maximization.”? Frequently, this is not a significant 
problem given the context, but it is worth noting that “shareholder primacy”? is best 
understood as referring to the identification of shareholders as the locus of control of the 
corporation, while “shareholder wealth maximization”? is best understood as a goal of 
corporate governance independent of which group holds power. See Bainbridge, supra 
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corporate governance have less normatively appealing implications—at 
least from the perspective of those who favor a mandatory form of corpo-
rate social responsibility. In light of this, I conclude that proponents of 
mandatory CSR should turn to corporate personality theory, particularly 
concession theory, to provide support for their agenda, and I point to the 
Supreme Court’s 2010 Citizens United decision as an example of the cur-
rent practical relevance of corporate personality theory. 
Following this Introduction, Part I of this Essay provides an overview 
of the three competing theories of corporate governance as indicated 
above. In addition, I include a brief discussion of managerialism because I 
believe, along with many others, that there are still many corporations 
where the CEO reigns supreme. Part II then discusses corporate social 
responsibility, ultimately defining the concept in a way that challenges the 
hegemony of the previously described theories of corporate governance. In 
Part III, I then discuss the primary corporate personality theories—
including concession theory, aggregate theory, and real entity theory—
which I have previously aligned with the various theories of corporate 
governance described in Part I.7 Part IV combines all of the foregoing to 
argue that anyone favoring mandatory corporate social responsibility 
should also support concession theory because it is the theory that most 
empowers the state to mandate socially responsible behavior on the part of 
corporations. Finally, Part V addresses some foreseeable criticisms of my 
argument, and the last Part provides concluding remarks. 
I. THE COMPETING THEORIES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
In 1932, Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means published their famous book, 
The Modern Corporation and Private Property, wherein they identified 
the agency problem created by the separation of ownership from control in 
public corporations as the primary focus of corporate governance.8 As 
Brian Cheffins has noted: “The primary function of corporate governance 
in the United States has been to address the managerial agency cost problem 
                                                                                                                         
note 1, at 574 (“Although often used interchangeably, the terms ‘shareholder primacy’?
and ‘shareholder wealth maximization’?express distinct concepts.”). 
7 See Stefan J. Padfield, The Dodd-Frank Corporation: More Than a Nexus-of-Contracts, 
114 W. VA. L. REV. 209 (2011); Stefan J. Padfield, The Silent Role of Corporate Theory 
in the Supreme Court's Campaign Finance Cases, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 831 (2013); 
Stefan J. Padfield, Rehabilitating Concession Theory, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 327 (2014). 
8 See Douglas M. Branson, Corporate Governance “Reform”?and the New Corporate 
Social Responsibility, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 605, 605 (2001) (“The history of corporate 
governance ‘reform’?begins with Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means’s ‘The Modern Corpo-
ration and Private Property’?....”). 
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that afflicts publicly traded companies with dispersed share ownership. Berle 
and Means threw the spotlight on this type of agency cost problem—using 
different nomenclature—in their famous 1932 book ....”9 
However, it was arguably not until 1976, when Melvin Eisenberg pub-
lished The Structure of the Corporation: A Legal Analysis that modern 
corporate governance theory took off.10 Brian Cheffins attributes the delay 
to “changing market conditions and a deregulation trend that provided 
executives with unprecedented managerial discretion as the 20th century 
drew to a close.”11 In response to this, “Eisenberg challenged the insider-
dominated boards of the day, positing that the modern board should serve as 
an independent monitor that works to safeguard shareholder interests.”12 
A related timeline begins with Ronald Coase’s 1937 article, The Nature 
of the Firm,13 which “characterized the boundaries of the firm as the range 
                                                                                                                         
9 Brian R. Cheffins, The Corporate Governance Movement, Banks and the Financial 
Crisis, THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND 
FINANCIAL REGULATION (Jan. 27, 2014, 9:18 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov 
/2014/01/27/the-corporate-governance-movement-banks-and-the-financial-crisis/. I note 
that I, too, am focusing on publicly traded corporations. Private or closely held corporations 
pose separate issues. 
10 See Usha Rodrigues, A Conflict Primacy Model of the Public Board, 2013 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 1051, 1054 (2013) [hereinafter Rodrigues, Conflict Primacy] (“Melvin Eisen-
berg’s revolutionary vision of the board as independent monitor now dominates corporate 
governance.”) (citing MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: 
A LEGAL ANALYSIS (1976)); STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AFTER 
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 53 (2012) (“Although the modern understanding of the board’s 
role and function has no single parent, if one were to insist on finding someone to whom 
to give the bulk of the credit—or blame—the leading candidate probably would be Pro-
fessor Melvin Eisenberg.”). 
11 Brian R. Cheffins, The Corporate Governance Movement, Banks and the Financial 
Crisis (Univ. of Cambridge, European Corp. Governance Inst., Law Working Paper No. 
232, 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2365738. 
12 Rodrigues, Conflict Primacy, supra note 10, at 1056. Cf. id. at 1059 (“Develop-
ments in the 1970s ranging from the Penn Central Railroad bankruptcy and Watergate 
scandal to the birth of the corporate social responsibility movement led to the support for 
empowering independent directors.”). 
13 R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937). Margaret Blair and 
Lynn Stout explain: ?
One of the central questions in economic theory is: Why do firms exist? 
... In the wake of Ronald Coase's seminal piece on the nature of the 
firm, the literature on this question has developed along three main paths, 
each of which focuses on a different aspect of organizing productive ac-
tivities. The first path explores contracting problems that arise when 
one actor hires another to act on her behalf (the principal-agent problem). 
The second path examines problems associated with coordinating pro-
ductive activities where it is too costly to write and enforce complete 
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of exchanges over which the market system was superseded and resource 
allocation was accomplished instead by authority and direction.”14 This 
was ultimately followed by the 1976 article of Michael Jensen and William 
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Own-
ership Structure,15 which “substituted, for Coase’s conception of the firm, 
the competing conception that the firm was a nexus of contracts.”16 
Thus, as Stephen Bainbridge put it in his letter announcing his Sympo-
sium: “Corporate law and economics scholarship initially relied mainly on 
agency cost and nexus of contracts models.”17 In recent years, however, 
“various scholars have built on those foundations to construct three com-
peting models of corporate governance: director primacy, shareholder 
primacy, and team production.”18 These models all seek to identify, as a 
normative and/or positive matter, (1) where the locus of control over the 
corporation does and/or should reside, and (2) toward what end that con-
trol is and/or should be exercised.19 The following sub-parts will examine 
these models, along with managerialism, in greater detail. 
                                                                                                                         
contracts, focusing especially on the role played by property rights as a 
solution for closing contractual gaps (the property rights approach). 
The third path considers the role hierarchy may play in policing against 
shirking problems that may arise in coordinating team production (the 
team production approach). 
Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 
VA. L. REV. 247, 257–58 (1999). 
14 Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception That the Corporation is a Nexus of Con-
tracts, and the Dual Nature of the Firm, 24 J. CORP. L. 819, 820 (1999). 
15 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). 
16 Eisenberg, supra note 14, at 822. Cf. Blair & Stout, supra note 13, at 319 n.189 
(noting that “[t]he idea that a firm is a ‘nexus of contracts’? is usually traced to Alchian & 
Demsetz” but also noting that “Eugene Fama and Michael Jensen may have been the first 
to have used the phrase”) (citing Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, 
Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972); Eugene 
F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 
301, 302 (1983)). 
17 Bainbridge Letter, supra note 3. 
18 Id. 
19 See generally Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 605. 
Any model of corporate governance must answer two basic sets of 
questions: (1) Who decides? In other words, which corporate constitu-
ency possesses ultimate decisionmaking power? (2) When the ultimate 
decisionmaker, whoever it may be, is presented with a zero sum game 
in which it must prefer the interests of one corporate constituency over 
those of all others, whose interests prevail?” 
Id. 
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A. Director Primacy 
Stephen Bainbridge is most frequently associated with the director 
primacy model of corporate governance.20 Director primacy posits that 
control of the corporation rests with the board of directors, and that this 
control is to be used to maximize shareholder wealth.21 As a positive mat-
ter, it appears clear that state corporate law does indeed place control over 
the corporation into the hands of the board of directors.22 As Usha Ro-
drigues has noted: “In the 1970s corporate codes were amended to add that 
the corporation is managed by ‘or under the direction of’? the board of 
directors—a nod to the changed reality of corporate America.”23 However, 
Usha Rodrigues has also recently pointed out that the ultimate day-to-day 
control may actually be better described as managerial.24 Furthermore, 
while the law nominally elevates shareholder wealth maximization as the 
goal of corporate governance, cases like A.P. Smith Manufacturing Co. v. 
Barlow (upholding board’s decision to donate money to Princeton Univer-
sity in face of shareholder challenge),25 Shlensky v. Wrigley (upholding 
board’s decision not to install lights at Wrigley Field despite shareholder’s 
evidence that the team was losing money due to the decision and that the 
decision was motivated primarily by the board’s feelings about the sancti-
ty of daytime baseball and concerns about the surrounding community),26 
and even Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. (forcing corporation to pay out divi-
dends to shareholders rather than use the money to benefit non-
shareholders)27 make clear that the deference granted directors to choose 
the course of action taken to pursue creation of shareholder wealth under 
                                                                                                                         
20 Bainbridge Letter, supra note 3 (“In Stephen Bainbridge’s director primacy model, 
the board of directors is not a mere agent of the shareholders, but rather is a sui generis 
body whose powers are ‘original and undelegated.’”). 
21 See Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 550. 
22 Cf. Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth That Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value, 
113 COLUM. L. REV. 1637, 1653–54 (2013) (“In the context of antitakeover defenses, 
[board] insulation advocates have thus far prevailed.”). 
23 Rodrigues, Conflict Primacy, supra note 10, at 1086 . 
24 Id. at 1056 (“Despite the central role the board plays in statutes, in practice the 
CEO and other executives have long dominated corporate life.”). 
25 98 A.2d 581, 585 (N.J. 1953), appeal dismissed, 346 U.S. 861 (1953). Cf. Bain-
bridge, supra note 1, at 561 n.70 (“In Barlow, the court broadly endorsed the corporate 
social responsibility doctrine. As I have argued elsewhere, however, Barlow’s result is 
not inconsistent with the wealth maximization norm and, in any event, represents the 
minority view among decided cases.”) (citing Stephen M. Bainbridge, Interpreting Non-
Shareholder Constituency Statutes, 19 PEPP. L. REV. 971, 979 (1992)). 
26 237 N.E.2d 776, 779 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968). 
27 170 N.W. 668, 685  (Mich. 1919). 
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the business judgment rule makes shareholder wealth “satisfaction”? a 
more apt descriptor.28 The reason I cite Dodge v. Ford here as an example 
of how much freedom boards have to ignore shareholder wealth maximi-
zation is because I believe that opinion can fairly be read as standing for 
the proposition that Henry Ford would have been free to deny his share-
holders dividends and use the cash on hand for “the primary purpose of 
benefiting others”29 if he had only put forth even a modicum of effort in 
defending his plan as good for business, which should have been quite 
easy in light of Barlow and Shlensky,30 as opposed to defiantly defending 
his right to allocate corporate assets purely for the benefit of his workers 
and consumers.31 All of which is to say that, so long as the corporation 
creates sufficient wealth for shareholders to keep them satisfied enough to 
avoid revolt, the board will be free to pursue any number of non-shareholder-
wealth-maximizing paths.32 However, as will be discussed in more detail 
below, this is still a far cry from mandatory CSR. 
                                                                                                                         
28 Cf. Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 602 n.269 (“I concede that the business judgment 
rule has the effect of insulating the board of directors from liability when they put the 
interests of nonshareholder constituencies ahead of those of shareholders, but deny that 
that is the rule’s intent.”) (discussing Wrigley). 
29 Dodge, 170 N.W. at 684. 
30 While Barlow and Shlensky were decided years after Ford, the willingness of the 
courts in those cases to protect corporate decision making from shareholder challenge 
suggests it would not have taken much for the Ford court to do the same. However, the 
timing of the cases may distinguish them as well. 
31 Cf. Kent Greenfield & John E. Nilsson, Gradgrind’s Education: Using Dickens and 
Aristotle to Understand (and Replace?) the Business Judgment Rule, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 
799, 814 (1997) (“In the press, Ford had been defiant, proclaiming his decision to rein-
vest in the company ‘[in order] to spread the benefits of this industrial system to the 
greatest possible number, to help them build up their lives and their homes.’”) (quoting 
Dodge v. Ford, 170 N.W. at 671). 
32 Some have argued that it is impossible for management to merely satisfy share-
holders in a competitive market. This proposition, however, is highly contested. See 
Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. 
REV. 757, 763–64 (1995) (exploring path dependency theory of corporate law in which 
inefficient legal rules persist due to network externalities); Michal Barzuza, Noise 
Adopters in Corporate Governance, 2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 627, 627 (2013) (“‘[N]oise 
adopters,’? namely firms whose corporate governance is determined by non-substantive 
factors such as attorneys’? boilerplates, network externalities, and mere inertia, provide 
camouflage to insiders with a strong preference for entrenchment.”); John W. Cioffi, 
Book Review, 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 763, 764 (2004) (reviewing MARK J. ROE, THE 
POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: POLITICAL CONTEXT, CORPORATE 
IMPACT (2003)) (“[Mark Roe] argues that incorporation of political forces in the analysis 
provides a fuller and more robust account of cross-national divergence in corporate 
governance systems and ownership than do purely legal and economic theories of corpo-
rate governance regimes.”). Cf. Blair & Stout, supra note 13, at 252–53, 282 (“[S]o long 
as each member of the coalition receives even a modest premium over his opportunity 
cost, he has incentive to remain in the team.”). 
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As for whether placing control in the hands of the board is best as a 
normative matter, Lucian Bebchuk has recently made a compelling argu-
ment that shareholders at the very least deserve more power than they 
currently have.33 Furthermore, whether shareholder wealth maximization 
is normatively the best goal of corporate governance has been debated 
extensively.34 For purposes of this Essay, I am asking what the implica-
tions are of adopting mandatory corporate social responsibility as the goal, 
and thus I leave the normative debate to others for now. In other words, I 
posit that given the number of scholars and other commentators who have 
advocated for some form of mandatory CSR, the mandatory CSR model of 
corporate governance deserves to be taken seriously.35  Furthermore, if 
none of the current primary models of corporate governance can accom-
modate mandatory CSR as a normative matter, then there may be reason 
to question the hegemony of these models. 
To sum up on director primacy, while there is good evidence to sup-
port the theory as a positive matter, there are also strong arguments sug-
gesting corporations operate differently in the real world. More importantly 
for purposes of this Essay, director primacy does not appear to provide 
normative support for mandatory CSR,36 and thus we must look elsewhere 
                                                                                                                         
33 See Bebchuk, supra note 22, at 1637 (“[T]he available empirical evidence provides 
no support for the claim that board insulation increases overall value in the long term. To 
the contrary, the evidence favors the view that board insulation at current or higher levels 
does not serve the long-term interests of companies and their shareholders.”). 
34 See William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s Corporatist 
Origins: Adolf Berle and the Modern Corporation, 34 J. CORP. L. 99, 100 (2008) (“A 
continuing and longstanding debate has been waged in corporate law scholarship among 
those who favor shareholder primacy, those who favor management discretion, and those 
who believe that corporations have a social responsibility to other constituencies, such as 
the corporation’s employees, and the wider public interest.”). 
35 See, e.g., Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical Framework for En-
forcing Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70 TEX. L. REV. 579, 585 (1992) (“Having estab-
lished a theoretical justification for the new constituency statutes and their relationship to 
emerging case law, I will then in Part III offer a two-part model for enforcement of these 
statutes.”); Gary von Stange, Corporate Social Responsibility Through Constituency 
Statutes: Legend or Lie?, 11 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 461, 490 (1994) (“If legislatures truly wish 
to accomplish corporate social responsibility through constituency statutes, then legisla-
tures must ... expressly mandate consideration for nonshareholder constituencies ....”); Marleen 
A. O’Connor, The Human Capital Era: Reconceptualizing Corporate Law to Facilitate 
Labor-Management Cooperation, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 899, 902 (1993) (“In this [a]rticle, 
I focus on expanding the existing fiduciary duties of directors to encompass obligations 
to employees.”). Cf. Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 550 (“Any model that commands the 
loyalty of one or more generations of scholars doubtless has more than a grain of truth.”). 
36 See Stephen Bainbridge, Director Primacy Is About the Allocation of Power, Not How 
It Used, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (Aug. 2, 2012, 10:57 AM), http://www.profes 
sorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2012/08/director-primacy-is-about-the-alloca 
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if we are to answer the question of where proponents of mandatory CSR 
can find theoretical support for their position. To that end, we next exam-
ine the theories of team production, shareholder primacy, and managerialism. 
B. Team Production 
Like the director primacy theory of corporate governance, the team pro-
duction theory locates control of the corporation in the board of direc-
tors.37 However, team production theory posits the goal of that control to 
be the mediation of the competing interests of the various relevant stake-
holders.38 Thus, like director primacy, team production theory seems to 
capture the legal reality of board control?and may provide a better descrip-
tion of the practical reality of how that control is implemented, again sub-
ject to the claims of managerialism regarding personal enrichment by 
those in control.39 
Stephen Bainbridge has noted that, “[a]lthough team production is not 
explicitly normative, many commentators regard it as at least being compat-
ible with stakeholder theorists who promote corporate social responsibility.”40 
Although Blair and Stout tend to downplay the normative implications 
of their model, they acknowledge that it “resonates”?with the views of 
progressive corporate legal scholarship. They differ from the progres-
sive wing of the corporate law academy mainly on positive grounds. 
Many progressives believe that corporate directors currently do not take 
sufficient account of nonshareholder constituency interests and that legal 
reform is necessary. In contrast, Blair and Stout believe that corporate 
directors do take such interests into account and the current law is ade-
quate in this regard.41 
However, Margaret Blair has clarified that “[t]he team production argument 
is that all the parties will be better off if they delegate decision-making to a 
                                                                                                                         
tion-of-power-not-how-it-used.html (“[D]irector primacy is about the allocation of power 
within the firm, and has little to say about how that power is to be used (other than requir-
ing that it be used to maximize shareholder wealth).”). 
37 See generally Blair & Stout, supra note 13, at 280–81 (“[T]he directors are trustees 
for the corporation itself—mediating hierarchs whose job is to balance team members’ 
competing interests in a fashion that keeps everyone happy enough that the productive 
coalition stays together.”). 
38 Id. 
39 Cf. Donald E. Schwartz, Book Review: In Search of Corporate Soul: The Structure 
of the Corporation: By Melvin Aron Eisenberg, 87 YALE L.J. 685, 687 (1978) (“Eisen-
berg finds ... managerialism is dangerous because management’s interests may conflict with 
those of the stockholders.”). 
40 Bainbridge Letter, supra note 3. 
41 Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 593–94. 
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non-team member. But it does not say that the decision-maker must pursue 
CSR goals.”42 In other words, to the extent I am viewing the implications of 
the primary corporate governance models through the lens of those who seek 
mandatory CSR, team production theory still leaves much to be desired. 
C. Shareholder Primacy 
The shareholder primacy model differs from director primacy and 
team production theory by arguing that shareholders, rather than the board 
of directors, should serve as the locus of control for corporations—or at 
least hold more control than they currently do.43 Not surprisingly, share-
holder primacy agrees with director primacy that the goal of corporate 
governance should be shareholder wealth maximization.44 Lucian Bebchuk 
recently authored a compelling defense of shareholder primacy, wherein 
he addressed criticisms coming from those who argue that it is best to 
insulate directors from shareholder power: 
Although insulation advocates often lump them together, there are two 
different mechanisms through which shareholder pressure is alleged to 
produce long-term costs .... I refer to [the first] claim—that activists 
with short-term orientation urge actions that are profitable in the short 
term but value-reducing in the longer term—as the myopic activists 
claim .... [A] complementary claim [is] that fear of shareholder inter-
vention (or even removal by shareholders) in the event that manage-
ment fails to deliver good short-run outcomes leads management itself 
to initiate and take actions that are profitable in the short term but det-
rimental in the long term. I refer to this claim as the counterproductive 
accountability claim.45 
                                                                                                                         
42 Email from Margaret Blair to author (Jan. 15, 2014, 9:57 PM) (on file with author). 
43 See generally Bebchuk, supra note 22, at 1644 (“I would like to stress that I do not 
argue—nor do I believe—that the optimal level of board insulation is zero. The board 
insulation view—the view that I do seek to challenge—refers throughout to the view that 
existing or higher levels of insulation are beneficial in the long term.”); Bainbridge Let-
ter, supra note 3 (“Scholars such as Lucian Bebchuk working with this model are gener-
ally concerned with issues of managerial accountability to shareholders. In recent years, 
these scholars have been closely identified with federal reforms designed to empower 
shareholders.”). 
44 Cf. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 
89 GEO. L.J. 439, 439 (2001) (“There is no longer any serious competitor to the view that 
corporate law should principally strive to increase long-term shareholder value.”); Mark 
J. Roe, The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and Industrial Organization, 149 U. 
PA. L. REV. 2063, 2065 (2001) (noting that “[s]hareholder wealth maximization is usually 
accepted as the appropriate goal in American business circles”). 
45 Bebchuk, supra note 22, at 1658. 
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Bebchuk then proceeded to examine various empirical studies relevant 
to the claims and concluded: 
Overall, analyzing the publicly available data on stock returns provides 
no support for the myopic activists claim that activist intervention 
makes shareholders of target companies worse off in the long term .... 
[Likewise], the counterproductive accountability claim advanced by in-
sulation advocates is not supported by the empirical evidence. To the 
contrary, the existing body of evidence supports the view that existing 
or higher levels of board insulation are value-decreasing both in the 
short term and the long term.46 
Thus, Bebchuk has made a strong argument for shareholder primacy as 
providing a better normative model of who should control the corpora-
tion.47 However, Usha Rodrigues has noted that “the shareholders them-
selves cannot be in charge of the corporation, or they lose the benefits of 
the separation of ownership and control.”48 In addition, Stephen Bainbridge 
has noted that, “[a]t the most basic level, the mechanical difficulties of 
achieving consensus amongst thousands of decisionmakers impede share-
holders from taking an active role.”49 Finally, the shareholder primacy 
goal of shareholder wealth maximization is subject to the same criticisms as 
it is under director primacy.50 Most importantly for purposes of this Essay, 
                                                                                                                         
46 Id. at 1676, 1686. 
Board insulation eliminates or substantially weakens ... incentives to 
serve shareholders. Thus, it can be expected to increase slack, empire 
building, excessive pay, and other forms of private benefits. It can also 
be expected to make insiders more inclined to act in ways that are bene-
ficial to or convenient for themselves but costly to shareholders. The 
evidence indicates that board insulation does indeed have such adverse 
effects .... In addition, there is evidence that board insulation enables man-
agers to increase their own benefits. 
Id. at 1679–80. 
47 One might argue that current shareholder voting rights, along with the right to sue 
directors for breach of fiduciary duty, make shareholder primacy compelling as a positive 
matter as well. However, “[c]areful analysis reveals … that these rights are so limited as to 
be almost nonexistent.” Blair & Stout, supra note 13, at 320. 
48 Rodrigues, Conflict Primacy, supra note 10, at 1058. Cf. United States v. Milwaukee 
Refrigerator Transit Co., 142 F. 247, 255 (C.C.E.D. Wis. 1905) (justifying piercing the 
corporate veil to hold shareholders personally liable for the debts of the corporation by 
stating that “[i]f any general rule can be laid down … it is that a corporation will be looked 
upon as a legal entity as a general rule … until sufficient reason to the contrary appears”). 
49 Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 557. 
50 Cf. Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. 
REV. 833, 908–13 (responding to the claim that increasing shareholder power may have 
adverse effects on stakeholders); Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Fran-
chise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675, 729–31 (same). 
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the shareholder wealth maximization norm of shareholder primacy leaves 
no room for mandatory CSR as a normative matter. 
D.  Managerialism 
While managerialism was not one of the corporate governance models 
identified for discussion at the Symposium, the reality of board capture by 
inside management makes the perspective worth at least mentioning here.51 
Essentially, managerialism posits that corporate executives, particularly 
the CEO, are the true bearers of control in the corporation. Usha Rodrigues 
recently advanced this position in her paper, A Conflict Primacy Model of 
the Public Board, wherein she notes: “Despite the central role the board 
plays in statutes, in practice the CEO and other executives have long dom-
inated corporate life.”52 This executive dominance has only been exacerbated 
by what Rodrigues refers to as modern corporate law “fetishizing independ-
ence” among directors, thereby decreasing entity-specific expertise on boards 
with concomitant increased dependence on corporate insiders.53 In addition: 
The American Bar Association Task Force on Corporate Responsibility 
noted that many aspects of an outside director's role reflect a depend-
ence on senior management: “Typically, senior management plays a 
significant part in the selection of directors, in proposing the compensa-
tion for directors, in selecting their committee assignments, in setting 
agendas for their meetings, and in evaluating their performance.”54 
It is worth noting that Stephen Bainbridge himself has acknowledged 
this reality to some extent.55 
                                                                                                                         
51 Cf. LUIGI ZINGALES, PREVENTING ECONOMISTS' CAPTURE, IN PREVENTING REGULA-
TORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT (Daniel Carpenter 
& David Moss eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2013) (“Regulatory capture is so pervasive 
precisely because it is driven by standard economic incentives, which push even the most 
well-intentioned regulators to cater to the interest of the regulated.”). 
52Rodrigues, Conflict Primacy, supra note 10, at 1056. Cf. id. at 1062 (“The average 
director spends roughly twenty hours a month on the governance of his or her company.”). 
53 Id. at 1053 (“By fetishizing independence, we have created boards of individuals 
especially ill-suited to monitoring the corporation’s full range of work.”). 
54 Id. at 1060–61. 
55 STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 19 (2008) (acknowledging the view that “[n]either shareholders nor directors 
run the corporation; CEOs do,”?and that “[m]anagerialism may have fallen out of favor as 
a normative theory of corporate governance, but it remains the work-a-day world reality,”?
but arguing that “the balance of power is shifting from imperial CEOs to boards”). Cf. 
Noemie Bisserbe, Jeanne Whalen & Hester Plumridge, Sanofi Fires CEO as Tensions 
Boil Over, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 29, 2014) (“Sanfori directors say the episode wasn’t the first 
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As alluded to above, managerialism arguably exacerbates the agency 
problem even more than what one might reasonably expect under director 
primacy or team production.56 That is to say, the control wielded by ex-
ecutives can be expected to be used by the executives to enrich themselves 
at the expense of shareholders and other stakeholders.57 For this reason, 
Rodrigues argues for a “conflict primacy view of the board [which] makes a 
virtue out of a vice by limiting the independent board’s responsibilities to 
those areas where independence matters: problems of conflict of interest.”58 
In light of this heightened risk of self-dealing, advocates of mandatory CSR 
are unlikely to find any more support for their agenda via managerialism 
than via director primacy or team production.59 
Having set forth the primary theories of corporate governance, and 
found them all wanting in terms of supporting mandatory CSR, we turn 
now to explore corporate social responsibility in more detail? before pro-
ceeding to consider corporate personality theories as a possible source of 
support for advocates of mandatory CSR. Clarifying the construct of cor-
porate social responsibility should make it easier for the reader to under-
stand why the modern theories of corporate governance may fall short 
from the perspective of advocates of mandatory CSR. The discussion will 
also set the stage for an explication of how corporate personality theory 
may provide the sought after theoretical support. 
                                                                                                                         
time they felt ill informed about [CEO] Viehbacher’s plans. Despite having general con-
fidence in the turnaround strategy he’s pursued, they say he displayed an uncommunicative 
management style that led to his abrupt ouster on Wednesday.”), available at http://on 
.wsj.com/1zHXYcf. 
56 See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 43, at 444 (noting “the conventional wis-
dom that, when managers are given great discretion over corporate investment policies, 
they tend to serve disproportionately their own interests”). 
57 Cf. Rodriguez, Conflict Primacy, supra note 10, at 1066 (“The evidence suggests 
that ... modern boards merely rubber-stamp managerial decisions when asked to evaluate 
them.”); id. at 1068 (“Professor Lawrence Mitchell notes that the advent of independent 
boards has made boards overly dependent on the CEO for information and thus placed 
‘the CEO in an enormously powerful position, with every incentive to present information 
to the board in a light that is most favorable to him.’”) (quoting Lawrence E. Mitchell, 
Structural Holes, CEOs, and Informational Monopolies: The Missing Link in Corporate 
Governance, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1313, 1349 (2005)).  
58 Rodrigues, Conflict Primacy, supra note 10, at 1068. 
59 As a positive matter, the expectation is that managers will use their power to enrich 
themselves at the expense of other stakeholders. As a normative matter, there may be 
room to argue that managers should be in control because they are in the best position to 
balance the competing interests of stakeholders in a way not entirely opposed to CSR. 
However, it is highly doubtful that, like in the case of team production theory, there exists 
a clear path from managerialism to mandatory CSR. Cf. Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 550 
(“Managerialist models assume that top management controls the corporation, but differ 
as to the interests managers should pursue.”). 
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II. CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
One version of the history of corporate social responsibility is provided 
by Douglas Branson in his article, Corporate Governance “Reform”? and 
the New Corporate Social Responsibility: 
The history of corporate governance “reform”?… has been the postula-
tion, by academics and others, of solutions to problems posed by the 
separation of ownership from control. One subset of proposed reforms, 
those of the 1970s, formed the “corporate social responsibility move-
ment.”? During that era, reformers urged governmental intervention 
which, as a matter of general corporate law, would expand corporate 
responsibility from primarily shareholders, to workers, consumers, sup-
pliers, communities in which the corporation had a significant presence, 
clean air, clean water, and other constituencies. At times, most particu-
larly during the heyday of the law and economics movement, scholars 
posited that the separation of ownership from control posed no problem 
at all. Instead it was an efficient allocation of investor and managerial 
resources. Thus, law and economics eclipsed the corporate social re-
sponsibility movement. Seldom in the annals of jurisprudence has one 
jurisprudence ascended so quickly, while the one it supplanted simulta-
neously faded into oblivion.60 
One way of thinking about corporate social responsibility is to view it 
as an alternative to the previously discussed models of corporate governance 
in terms of goals.61 That is to say, while both director primacy and share-
holder primacy view shareholder wealth maximization as the proper goal of 
corporate governance, and team production theory espouses a goal of stake-
holder mediation that also does not extend to mandating social responsibility,62 
                                                                                                                         
60 Branson, supra note 8, at 605; see also Mark J. Loewenstein, Benefit Corporations: 
A Challenge in Corporate Governance, 68 BUS. LAW. 1007, 1038 n.1 (2013) (“Many 
scholars recognize that the famous exchange of articles between Professors Berle and 
Dodd was critical in launching the debate on a corporation’s social responsibility.”); 
Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 561 (“Berle thought the law should put renewed emphasis on 
managers’? fiduciary duty to maximize shareholder wealth. In contrast, Dodd argued that 
corporations have a ‘social service [responsibility] as well as a profit-making function.’”); 
Blair & Stout, supra note 13, at 303 (“By the 1950s, Berle was ready to concede that, as a 
matter of law, ‘[corporate] powers [are] held in trust for the entire community.’”). 
61 Cf. Antony Page & Robert A. Katz, Is Social Enterprise the New Corporate Social 
Responsibility?, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1351, 1351 (2011) (“Despite vigorous debate 
since the 1930s, the notion of corporate social responsibility (CSR) remains in flux.”). 
62 Cf. Blair & Stout, supra note 13. 
[O]ur analysis appears to parallel many of the arguments raised in re-
cent years by the “communitarian” or “progressive” school of corporate 
scholars who believe that corporate law ought to require directors to 
serve not only the shareholders’ interests, but also those of employees, 
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mandatory CSR supports affirmatively elevating social responsibility over 
shareholder wealth maximization in at least some cases.63 Simply put, the 
CSR position is that shareholder wealth may be sacrificed if the net social 
gain is positive, so that a board may defend its actions by pointing to some 
accounted-for social benefit even when it demurs on the issue of share-
holder wealth maximization.64 
For purposes of this Essay, I am going to focus on constituency statutes 
as my proxy for CSR because they represent arguably the only “positive 
corporate law that directly seeks to advance the cause of CSR or constitu-
ency theory.”65 Constituency statutes arose out of the takeover boom of 
the 1970s, when legislatures sought to protect local jobs and businesses by 
granting boards express permission, if not a mandate, to consider interests 
other than short-term shareholder value, which might otherwise be the 
                                                                                                                         
consumers, creditors, and other corporate “stakeholders.” We believe, 
however, that our mediating hierarchy approach ... carries very differ-
ent policy implications: Where progressives have argued that corporate 
law ought to be reformed to make directors more accountable to stake-
holders, the mediating hierarchy approach suggests that directors should 
not be under direct control of either shareholders or other stakeholders. 
Id. at 253–54. 
63 Cf. id. at 308 n.157 (“The team production model explains how sacrificing share-
holders’?interests to stakeholders’?can sometimes serve the interests of both groups in the 
long run.”). 
64 Cf. MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (2002) (“Few trends could 
so thoroughly undermine the very foundation of our free society as the acceptance by 
corporate officials of a social responsibility other than to make as much money for their 
shareholders as possible. This is a fundamentally subversive doctrine.”). But see Bain-
bridge, supra note 1, at 565 (“[O]wnership of the residual claim is not the same as owner-
ship of the firm itself .... Hence, we can throw Friedman’s concept of ownership out the 
window, along with its associated economic and ethical baggage.”). 
65 Matthew T. Bodie, Nascar Green: The Problem of Sustainability in Corporations 
and Corporate Law, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 491, 498 (2011) (“Other than constituency 
statutes, there has been little in the positive corporate law that directly seeks to advance the 
cause of CSR or constituency theory.”); see also Robert T. Esposito, The Social Enter-
prise Revolution in Corporate Law: A Primer on Emerging Corporate Entities in Europe 
and the United States and the Case for the Benefit Corporation, 4 WM. & MARY BUS. L. 
REV. 639, 653 (2013) (identifying “several examples of CSR, including corporate respon-
sibility reporting (CR reporting), corporate codes of conduct, and constituency statutes”?
as well as shareholder proposals); id. at 660 (“While most lawmakers likely had change-
of-control decisions in mind when enacting constituency statutes, CSR proponents observe 
that the application of constituency statutes is not necessarily limited to situations in which 
the corporation is for sale ....”); Timothy L. Fort, Corporate Constituency Statutes: A 
Dialectical Interpretation, 15 J.L. & COM. 257, 257 (1995) (identifying the “stakeholder 
theory of corporate social responsibility [as] codified in part by state corporate constitu-
ency statutes”). 
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requirement under Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.66 
In Revlon, the Delaware Supreme Court held that “when ... it became 
apparent to all that the break-up of the company was inevitable ... [t]he 
duty of the board ... changed from the preservation of Revlon as a corpo-
rate entity to the maximization of the company’s value at a sale for the 
stockholders’?benefit.”67 The statutes have been heavily criticized because 
none of the stakeholders implicated could actually sue the board, and thus 
the statutes basically turned into cover for insider entrenchment.68 For this 
reason, I am going to focus on mandatory constituency statutes that grant 
certain enforcement rights to covered stakeholders.69  
In other words, in assessing the viability of the various theories dis-
cussed herein for supporting mandatory CSR, the reader may find it useful 
to use mandatory constituency statutes as a relevant yardstick.  If the theory 
under consideration could support a mandatory constituency statute, then it 
is likely a good fit for mandatory CSR more generally. I note that while 
constituency statutes have been heavily criticized as inefficient, adding 
stakeholder enforcement rights arguably should serve as an additional moni-
toring tool against management self-dealing. One possible route to account-
ability and enforcement via constituency statutes is to mandate stakeholder 
impact statements and allow stakeholders to sue for corrections of mis-
statements and material omissions, with plaintiffs’ attorneys acting as private 
                                                                                                                         
66 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986). 
67 Id. at 182. Revlon provided a gloss on Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum, which had held 
that directors may consider the “impact on ‘constituencies’ other than shareholders (i.e., 
creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps even the community generally),” Unocal 
Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co. 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985), when deciding on defensive 
measures in the face of a hostile acquisition attempt. Compare Blair & Stout, supra note 
13, at 308 (“Unocal squarely rejects shareholder primacy in favor of the view that the 
interests of the ‘corporation’ include the interests of nonshareholder constituencies.”) (citing 
Unocal Corp., 493 A.2d at 954), with id. at 308 n.157 (“In [Revlon], the Delaware Supreme 
Court suggested that directors could consider other constituencies’? interests only when 
doing so ultimately provided some benefit to shareholders as well.”). But see generally 
Lyman Johnson & Rob Ricca, The Dwindling of Revlon, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 167 
(2014); Mohsen Manesh, Nearing 30, Is Revlon Showing Its Age?, 71 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. ONLINE 107 (2014), http://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr-online/vol71/iss2 
/6, (responding to Johnson & Ricca article); Lyman P.Q. Johnson & Robert Ricca, The 
Still-Dwindled Revlon, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 150 (2014), http://scholarly 
commons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr-online/vol71/iss3/1 (responding to Manesh article). 
68 Cf. Mitchell, supra note 34, at 580. 
69 Cf. von Stange, supra note 34, at 490 (1994) (“If legislatures truly wish to accomplish 
corporate social responsibility through constituency statutes, then legislatures must: (1) ex-
pressly mandate consideration for nonshareholder constituencies; (2) encourage account-
ability of incumbent management; (3) alter the composition of the board of directors to 
include nonshareholders; and (4) enable nonshareholder constituencies access to remedies.”). 
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attorneys general incentivized by fees.70 In addition, I qualify all the fore-
going by noting that the implementation of mandatory constituency statutes 
that are enforceable by stakeholders should not preclude consideration of 
the shareholder wealth consequences of the relevant business decision under 
consideration, nor should they preclude shareholder wealth maximizing ac-
tivities simply because they are shareholder wealth maximizing.71 Finally, 
                                                                                                                         
70 The use of disclosure to drive changes in corporate behavior is nothing new. See 
Rahim Kanani, The Future of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), FORBES (Feb. 9, 
2012, 7:38 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/rahimkanani/2012/02/09/the-future-of-cor 
porate-social-responsibility-csr/ (“In 2000 there might have been a dozen Fortune 500 
companies who issued a CSR or sustainability report. Now almost all of them do.”). Cf. 
Celia Taylor, CSR—and Other—Disclosure as “Compelled Speech”: The US and the EU 
Consider Very Different Approaches, THERACETOTHEBOTTOM.ORG (Apr. 24, 2014, 6:00 
AM), http://www.theracetothebottom.org/miscellaneous/csrand-other-disclosure-as-com 
pelledspeech-the-us-and-the-e.html (“The fate of compelled commercial speech is the 
subject of great uncertainty in the US at the moment [since] the conflict minerals rules 
issued by the SEC [were] subject to many legal challenges including one based on the 
First Amendment”); Celia Taylor, Conflict Minerals: On We Go: Challenge to be Heard 
by Full Court, THERACETOTHEBOTTOM.ORG (Nov. 21, 2014, 06:00AM), http://www.the 
racetothebottom.org/home/conflict-minerals-on-we-go-challenge-to-be-heard-by-full-cou 
.html (“[T]he United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia agreed to recon-
sider the last ruling in the on-going dispute of … the SEC’s conflict minerals rule ….”). 
One could even argue that in today’s globalized and interconnected world, the duty of 
care—which requires directors to become informed of all material information reasonably 
available—may already require such factors to be considered. Cf. Adam J. Sulkowski & 
Sandra Waddock, Beyond Sustainability Reporting: Integrated Reporting is Practiced, 
Required & More Would Be Better, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 1060, 1061 (2013) (arguing that 
“existing laws and related rules already require greater disclosure of data on environmental 
and societal impacts than commonly understood”). Furthermore, I believe the courts have 
recently demonstrated, in the context of Dodd-Frank’s advisory say-on-pay mandate, that they 
can effectively keep frivolous claims to a minimum. See generally Alison Frankel, Citi 
shareholders have slim chance of enforcing say-on-pay vote, REUTERS (Apr. 19, 2012), 
http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2012/04/19/citi-shareholders-have-slim-chance-of 
-enforcing-say-on-pay-vote/ (“About a dozen corporations that failed say-on-pay votes in 
2011 were sued in shareholder derivative actions accusing board members of breaching 
their duty. Only one of those suits has so far survived a dismissal motion.”). But see 
Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 558 (“Overcoming the collective action problems that pre-
vent meaningful involvement by the corporation’s various constituencies would be diffi-
cult and costly.”).  
71 See Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 583 n.176 (“[T]hese statutes do not reject the tradi-
tional shareholder wealth maximization norm. Instead, they modify the norm by allowing 
the board to make tradeoffs between shareholder and stakeholder interests.”). 
Boards of directors sometimes face decisions in which it is possible to 
make at least one corporate constituency better off without leaving any 
constituency worse off. In economic terms, such a decision is Pareto ef-
ficient because it moves the firm from a Pareto inferior position to the 
Pareto frontier. Other times, however, boards face a decision that 
makes at least one constituency better off but leaves at least one worse 
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I note that while it has been said that “[s]takeholderist models rarely focus 
on control issues, but instead emphasize that shareholders should not be 
the sole beneficiaries of director and officer fiduciary duties,”72 I am as-
suming the board will need to be the locus of control because this is the 
body the regulatory state has the most direct control over.73 
If we assume that constituency statutes can serve as a useful proxy for 
CSR, and take seriously the criticisms levied against the effectiveness of 
these statutes when unaccompanied by any sort of stakeholder enforce-
ment mechanism (i.e., when they are not in any meaningful sense manda-
tory), then the failure of the primary theories of corporate governance to 
provide a normative basis for strengthening these statutes serves as an 
example of how these theories fail to meet the needs of proponents of 
mandatory CSR. We now turn our attention to an alternative foundation 
for mandatory CSR: corporate personality theory. 
III. THE COMPETING THEORIES OF CORPORATE PERSONALITY 
Theories of corporate personality seek to define the nature of corpora-
tions so as to provide a framework within which to determine the rights and 
responsibilities of corporations vis-à-vis the rest of society.74 Thus, it may 
not be fair to try to align theories of corporate personality with theories of 
corporate governance, since the latter are concerned primarily with the 
internal relations (primarily between the shareholders and managers) of 
the corporation. However, on at least some level the distinction between 
internal and external relations becomes artificial, since the internal 
                                                                                                                         
off. For example, imagine a decision with a payoff for one constituency 
of $150 that leaves another constituency worse off by $100. As a 
whole, the organization is better off by $50. In economic terms, this de-
cision is Kaldor-Hicks efficient. With these concepts in mind, the 
shareholder wealth maximization norm can be described as a bar-
gained-for term of the board-shareholder contract by which the direc-
tors agree not to make Kaldor-Hicks efficient decisions that leave 
shareholders worse off. 
Id. at 583–84. 
72 Id. at 550. 
73 Cf. Dalia Tsuk Mitchell, Status Bound: The Twentieth Century Evolution of Direc-
tors' Liability, 5 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 63, 64 (2009) (“The board of directors is created by 
the state through its corporation statute and serves as a reminder of the public nature of 
the corporation.”). The distinction between theories such as director primacy and team 
production, which place corporate control in the hands of the board, and theories of 
corporate personality that grant the state broad discretion to use the board as a vehicle for 
regulation, will be made more clear in the discussion in the next Part distinguishing real 
entity theory from concession theory. 
74 Padfield, Rehabilitating Concession Theory, supra note 7, at 331–33. 
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decision making frequently implicates external parties.75 Partly for this 
reason, I have sought in my recent scholarship to align the dominant theo-
ries of corporate governance with the primary theories of corporate per-
sonality.76 However, in this Essay I focus on a divergence. While none of 
the three primary models of corporate governance support mandatory CSR 
as a normative matter, I hope to show that concession theory, one of the 
three primary corporate personality theories discussed below, may do so 
because of its focus on the corporation as a state creation intended to serve 
society at large under the umbrella of an active and engaged regulatory 
scheme—as opposed to the market-based orientation of the other models 
and theories. 
Specifically, the three primary theories of corporate personality are 
aggregate theory, real/natural entity theory, and concession/artificial entity 
theory.77 At the risk of oversimplifying, aggregate theory and real entity 
theory essentially presume corporations stand in the shoes of natural per-
sons (shareholders in the former case, and the board of directors in the 
latter), and thus have available to them all the rights of natural persons in 
resisting government regulation.78 Concession theory, on the other hand, 
views the corporation as fundamentally a state creation, and presumes the 
state has the right to regulate its creation as it sees fit.79 Thus, it is most 
likely that concession theory, rather than aggregate or real entity theory, 
holds the most promise for mandatory CSR as conceived herein.80 What 
follows is a further explanation of each of the three theories. 
                                                                                                                         
75 Cf. Virginia Harper Ho, Of Enterprise Principles and Corporate Groups: Does 
Corporate Law Reach Human Rights?, 52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 113, 113–14 (2013) 
(“Corporate law ... governs the ‘internal affairs’? of discrete legal entities within a given 
jurisdiction, each protected by a limited liability shield. Questions of global corporate 
accountability for human rights practices have therefore been viewed as beyond its reach. 
This Article challenges this accepted wisdom ....”).  
76  See Padfield, Rehabilitating Concession Theory, supra note 7, at 331 (2014) 
(“While one should be careful not to overstate the overlap between conceptualizations of 
the corporation for purposes of constitutional and corporate governance analysis … I 
have previously aligned real entity theory with the director-primacy and team-production 
theories.”); Padfield, The Silent Role of Corporate Theory in the Supreme Court's Cam-
paign Finance Cases, supra note 7, at 835 (“director-primacy/team-production theory and 
‘real entity’ theory are synonymous”); Padfield, The Dodd-Frank Corporation: More Than 
A Nexus-of-Contracts, supra note 7, at 215 (“The … real entity theory arguably captures 
the director-primacy view of the corporation.”). 
77 Padfield, Rehabilitating Concession Theory, supra note 7, at 330. 
78 Id. at 336–37. 
79 Id. at 333. 
80 Cf. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Cyclical Transformations of the Corporate Form: A 
Historical Perspective on Corporate Social Responsibility, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 767, 767 
(2005) (“[U]nder the real entity view, which is historically the dominant view of the 
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A. Artificial Entity/Concession Theory 
In the 1819 Supreme Court case of Trustees of Dartmouth College v. 
Woodward, Justice Marshall famously stated: 
A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing 
only in contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it pos-
sesses only those properties which the charter of its creation confers 
upon it, either expressly, or as incidental to its very existence. These are 
such as are supposed best calculated to effect the object for which it 
was created .... The objects for which a corporation is created are uni-
versally such as the government wishes to promote. They are deemed 
beneficial to the country; and this benefit constitutes the consideration, 
and, in most cases, the sole consideration of the grant.81 
This formulation has commonly been associated with concession theory, 
also known as artificial entity theory.82 As I have stated elsewhere, “of the 
three traditional theories of the corporation under constitutional law ... 
concession theory is the only one that legitimizes presumptive deference 
to state regulation.”83 Interestingly, concession theory has no good coun-
terpart among the primary theories of corporate governance discussed 
above.84 This may be due to the fact that corporate governance theory is 
primarily concerned with the internal affairs of the corporation (that is, the 
allocation of power among the board and shareholders),85 and thus is argu-
ably more focused on private ordering. However, it should also be noted 
that excluding the state from analysis of the internal affairs of the corpora-
tion can also be explained as a purposeful move that shifts the debate to 
the private side of the public-private divide and furthers a deregulatory 
agenda consistent with the law and economics movement of the late 
1970s.86 In other words, to say that the corporation is a nexus of contracts 
but then ignore the state as one of the primary contracting parties assumes 
many things that are likely contestable.87 
                                                                                                                         
corporation, CSR is normatively acceptable even when it does not contribute to the long-
run welfare of the shareholders.”). 
81 Trustees of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636–37 (1819). 
82 See Padfield, Rehabilitating Concession Theory, supra note 7, at 332. 
83 Id. at 329. 
84 Id. at 330–31. 
85 See Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 549–50. 
86 See Padfield, Rehabilitating Concession Theory, supra note 7, at 340-41 (“[N]otable 
landmarks in the modern contract vs. concession ‘war’ include the emergence of the law 
and economics movement in corporate law in the 1970s ....”). 
87 Cf. Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, The Uncorporation and the Unraveling 
of “Nexus of Contracts” Theory, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1127 (2011) (“A corporation is not a 
contract. It is a state-created entity.”). 
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At the risk of moving too far afield, I think a recent blog post by Ste-
phen Bainbridge regarding the recently decided Hobby Lobby case might 
be useful for further illuminating concession theory.88 Hobby Lobby in-
volved a challenge to the contraception insurance mandate of the Affordable 
Care Act.89 Specifically, the for-profit corporation Hobby Lobby claimed an 
exemption under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. 90  Among other 
things, the Court concluded that corporations have religious freedom rights.91 
I was one of forty-four corporate and criminal law professors to sign 
on to a brief arguing that the religious freedom rights of the owners should 
not be ascribed to the corporation.92 Stephen Bainbridge raised a number 
of challenges to this brief, including the following: 
[M]any of the signers are associated with the corporate social responsibility 
movement. In their vocational role as advocates of that view, they argue 
                                                                                                                         
88 Compare Stephen M. Bainbridge, Citizens United v. FEC: Stevens’?Pernicious Ver-
sion of the Concession Theory, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (Jan. 21, 2010, 4:05 PM), 
http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2010/01/citizens-united-v
 -fec-stevens-pernicious-version-of-the-concession-theory.html (“It has been over half-a-
century since corporate legal theory, of any political or economic stripe, took the conces-
sion theory seriously.”), with Padfield, Rehabilitating Concession Theory, supra note 7, 
at 329 (“I want to ‘rehabilitate’? concession theory ... because (1) of the three traditional 
theories of the corporation under constitutional law ... concession theory is the only one 
that legitimizes presumptive deference to state regulation, and (2) commentators have 
unduly marginalized concession theory in recent years.”). 
89 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). The Supreme Court 
explained: 
We must decide ... whether the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ... 
permits the United States Department of Health and Human Services 
(HHS) to demand that three closely held corporations provide health-
insurance coverage for methods of contraception that violate the sin-
cerely held religious beliefs of the companies’ owners. We hold that the 
regulations ... violate RFRA, which prohibits the Federal Government 
from taking any action that substantially burdens the exercise of reli-
gion unless that action constitutes the least restrictive means of serving 
a compelling government interest. 
Id. at 2759. 
90 Id. 
91 See generally Stefan J. Padfield, The Role of Corporate Personality Theory in Hobby 
Lobby, BUSINESS LAW PROF BLOG (July 6, 2014), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/busi 
ness_law/2014/07/the-role-of-corporate-personality-theory-in-hobby-lobby.html (noting 
that while Justice Alito’s majority opinion equated the closely held corporation with its 
controlling shareholders, and thus granted the corporation standing to claim interference 
with its free exercise rights, Justice Ginsburg argued in dissent that the corporation could 
not, as an artificial entity, exercise religion). 
92 Brief for Corporate and Criminal Law Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Peti-
tioners, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (Nos. 13-354, 13-356). 
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that corporations should consider the good of society when making 
corporate decisions. Except it seems when … Catholic and other reli-
giously-motivated shareholders want the corporation to address the so-
cial issue of abortion. I find all that more than just a little inconsistent.93 
I believe concession theory helps explain why the positions referenced 
above are not inconsistent. 
I begin with two fundamental propositions: (1) the republican form of 
government created by our Constitution, and of which our states are a part, 
is good and worth defending; (2) the grant of corporate status can be viewed 
as a subsidy from the state to further economic growth. The reason I say 
the grant of corporate status can be viewed as a subsidy is because without 
the limited liability shield provided by incorporation the investors/owners 
would be at risk of personal liability for the debts of the business.94 Essen-
tially, the state is shifting the cost of a certain subset of claims against the 
business from the owners to the claimants (at least in those cases where 
the corporation cannot satisfy the claim), and its justification for doing so 
is the overall net gain generated by allowing business to operate in the 
corporate form.95 However, at the same time there is a risk that the bene-
fits of incorporation will also foster powerful factions that could under-
mine the very state that created the corporation in the first place.96 Thus, 
the state is justified in limiting the scope of the corporate subsidy to eco-
nomic activity. 
Therefore, when a group of shareholders proclaim that not only should 
they be allowed to benefit from the corporate form for economic gain, but 
                                                                                                                         
93 Stephen Bainbridge, The Odd Inconsistencies in the Corporate Law Professor Brief 
in the Mandate Cases, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (Jan. 29, 2014, 5:23 PM), http:// 
www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2014/01/the-odd-inconsistencies 
-in-the-corporate-law-professor-brief-in-the-mandate-cases.html. 
94 See Padfield, Rehabilitating Concession Theory, supra note 7, at 337 (“If one … 
boils the corporation down to its shareholder owners, then one is essentially back to a 
form of general partnership where all the owners are personally liable for the debts of the 
business.”). 
95 See Martin Petrin, Reconceptualizing the Theory of the Firm-from Nature to Func-
tion, 118 PENN ST. L. REV. 1, 50 (2013) (“[L]imited liability is thought to offer two main 
advantages. First, it minimizes the risks associated with investing and thereby assists in 
aggregating capital. Second, it reduces the need for investors to monitor managers and 
fellow investors, which, in turn, reduces the cost of investing.”). 
96 See Stefan J. Padfield, The Separation of Church and For-Profit Corporations, 
BUSINESS LAW PROF BLOG (Feb. 23, 2014), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business 
_law/2014/02/the-separation-of-church-and-for-profit-corporations.html (“[B]ecause of 
their unique ability to consolidate power, corporations are aptly considered by many to be 
one of Madison’s feared factions that threaten to undermine the very democracy that 
supports their creation and growth.”). 
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also to further individual political and religious beliefs, the state may 
properly assert that this was never a part of the bargain and thus the share-
holders are over-reaching.97 In fact, for the state to essentially subsidize 
the furtherance of shareholders’ religious beliefs at the expense of employees 
implicates the separation of church and state and risks running afoul of the 
Establishment Clause.98 
On the other hand, striking the right balance between shareholder em-
powerment and managerial discretion, as well as experimenting with secu-
lar corporate purpose to maximize overall gain, seems perfectly within the 
proper scope of the laboratory of the states. This view of the state as the crea-
tor of the corporate form, which it then contracts with the incorporators to use 
for the general welfare, is representative of concession theory.99 Thus, of 
all the models and theories discussed herein, it is arguably only concession 
theory that has the ability to both provide a normative basis for mandatory 
                                                                                                                         
97 Cf. Ian S. Speir, Constitutional and Statutory Reservation Clauses and Constitu-
tional Requirements of General Laws with Respect to Corporations: The Fifty States and 
the District of Columbia (Apr. 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1820868 
(“Reservation clauses, reserving to the legislature a power to amend or repeal corporate 
charters, are included in the constitutions or corporation statutes of 49 states and the 
District of Columbia.”); Eric W. Orts, Beyond Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate 
Constituency Statutes, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 14, 69 (1992) (“Advocates of Contract 
Clause protection for shareholders are aware of the ‘reserve’?clauses resulting from Dart-
mouth College, but they appear to underestimate the full import of these powers. States 
have ‘reserved’?the freedom ... to ‘impair’?the rights of shareholders ....”). 
98 Cf. Frederick Mark Gedicks & Rebecca G.Van Tassell, RFRA Exemptions from the 
Contraception Mandate: An Unconstitutional Accommodation of Religion, 49 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 343, 343–44 (2014) (“If RFRA exemptions from the mandate violate the 
Establishment Clause, then that is the end of RFRA exemptions, regardless of whether 
for-profit corporations are persons exercising religion, the mandate is a substantial burden 
on employers’?anti-contraception beliefs, or the mandate is not the least restrictive means 
of protecting a compelling government interest.”); Sasha Volokh, Is RFRA Unconstitutional?, 
THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 1, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh 
-conspiracy/wp/2014/07/01/is-rfra-unconstitutional/ (“Justice Stevens is the only one who 
ever showed any sympathy for the argument that RFRA violates the Establishment 
Clause .... Nonetheless, Justice Stevens may have been right as a philosophical matter ….”). 
99 Cf. Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 549.  
Proponents of shareholder wealth maximization typically treat corpo-
rate governance as a species of private law, such that the separation of 
ownership and control does not in and of itself justify state intervention 
in corporate governance. In contrast, stakeholderists commonly treat 
corporate governance as a species of public law, such that the separa-
tion of ownership and control becomes principally a justification for 
regulating corporate governance so as to achieve social goals unrelated 
to corporate profitability. 
Id. 
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secular CSR, while at the same time restricting the ability of individuals to 
leverage the corporate subsidy (which has arguably been provided solely 
to further societal economic growth) for personal religious evangelism, 
and there is nothing inherently “inconsistent” about this line-drawing .100 
Finally, it has been suggested that Hobby Lobby meaningfully expanded 
the ability of corporations to pursue CSR activities. However, I believe the 
better view is that any expansion in this area attributable to Hobby Lobby 
is limited to closely held corporations with no complaining shareholders. 
Thus, while Lyman Johnson argued that in order “[t]o hold that close corpo-
rations were ‘free’? from the contraceptive mandate of the Affordable Care 
Act … the Court … had to determine that, under state corporate law, such 
companies are likewise ‘free’? from some imagined state legal mandate to 
maximize profits,”101 Stephen Bainbridge noted that “Hobby Lobby ... is 
best understood as recognizing the well-established principle that share-
holders of a closely held corporation can alter the default rules of corporate 
law, including the issue of corporate purpose”?and that Hobby Lobby should 
not be understood as changing the default rule, “especially by way of what 
is arguably dicta.”102 I agree with Bainbridge here because at the very least 
the doctrine of waste should allow any shareholder who disagreed to chal-
lenge corporate conduct that was pursued for purely religious or social 
responsibility purposes without any claimed shareholder wealth benefit,103 
and I do not believe Hobby Lobby changed that rule.104 Thus, the rules of 
                                                                                                                         
100 Some have argued that forcing individuals to choose between operating a business 
in the for-profit corporate form or staying true to their individual First Amendment rights 
in all their business activities constitutes the imposition of an unconstitutional condition 
on the privilege of incorporation. I have addressed this challenge elsewhere. See Padfield, 
Rehabilitating Concession Theory, supra note 7 (“[T]here are at least five good reasons 
to conclude that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine would not constitute an insur-
mountable obstacle to the viability of concession theory.”). 
101 Haskell Murray, Lyman Johnson—Hobby Lobby, a Landmark Corporate Law Deci-
sion, BUSINESS LAW PROF BLOG (July 2, 2014), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/busi 
ness_law/2014/07/lyman-johnson-hobby-lobby-a-landmark-corporate-law-decision.html. 
102 Stephen Bainbridge, Does Hobby Lobby Sound a Death Knell for Dodge v. Ford 
Motor Co.?, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (July 3, 2014, 2:35 PM), http://www.professor 
bainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2014/07/does-hobby-lobby-sound-a-death-knell 
-for-dodge-v-ford-motor-co.html. 
103 See Jonathan Romiti, Note, Playing Politics with Shareholder Value: The Case for 
Applying Fiduciary Law to Corporate Political Donations Post-Citizens United, 53 B.C. 
L. REV. 737, 740 (2012) (“Through suits based on the fiduciary duty of loyalty and the doc-
trine of waste, shareholders should be entitled to sue directors for use of the corporation’s 
wealth for what is often a nonbusiness purpose.”). 
104 See Joshua Fershee, Does Hobby Lobby Create a First Amendment Out for Fidu-
ciary Duties?, BUSINESS LAW PROF BLOG (June 30, 2014), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com 
/business_law/2014/06/does-hobby-lobby-create-a-first-amendment-out-for-fiduciary-du 
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shareholder wealth maximization and shareholder wealth satisfaction that I 
discussed earlier are best understood to remain the dominant default rules 
even after Hobby Lobby, and the problems this creates for mandatory CSR 
also remain, with concession theory thus also continuing to remain the 
most viable theory of corporate personality or governance to challenge 
that norm.105 
B. Aggregate Theory 
In the 1886 Supreme Court case of Santa Clara County v. Southern 
Pacific Railroad Co., the Court famously asserted that: 
The court does not wish to hear argument on the question whether the 
provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which for-
bids a State to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal pro-
tection of the laws, applies to these corporations. We are all of opinion 
that it does.106 
I have previously noted that “Morton Horwitz has convincingly argued 
that [Santa Clara] represented a shift to the aggregate view of the corpora-
tion.”107 The aggregate view rejected the fiction of the corporation as an 
                                                                                                                         
ties.html (“Can a corporation now choose to give a majority of its funds to a church, even 
if it harms the entity? I think no ....”). 
105 I have a friend who is fond of saying that all questions regarding the proper role of 
corporations in society are ultimately questions of political philosophy. For example, while 
concession theory may work as an argument against the majority’s opinion in Citizens 
United because the government in that case was clearly trying to regulate the corporation 
(see discussion of Citizens United infra Part IV), things get a bit trickier in Hobby Lobby 
because the government there is represented in both the ACA (imposing regulation) and 
RFRA (providing exemption). Put another way, even if one agrees that concession theory 
is the most accurate of the available theories of the corporation because it most realisti-
cally reflects the dominant role of the state in corporate issues, one is still left with the 
question of how the state should exercise its authority. At the risk of leaving an elephant 
standing unaddressed in the living room, I will beg the reader’s indulgence in accepting 
my claim that wandering down this particular rabbit hole is simply beyond the scope of 
this Essay. Ultimately, the fact that questions may remain to be answered after choosing 
concession theory as the best theory for mandatory CSR purposes does not equate to 
making that choice pointless. It is doubtful that any of the theories under consideration 
here answer all relevant questions, nor would denying any role for corporate theory at all 
be likely to stop the debating. On this last point, I stand with those who argue that corpo-
rate personality theory matters. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 68 (1992) (arguing that 
“the rise of a natural entity theory of the corporation was a major factor in legitimating 
big business and ... none of the other theoretical alternatives could provide as much 
sustenance to newly organized, concentrated enterprise”). 
106 Santa Clara Cnty. v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886). 
107 Padfield, Rehabilitating Concession Theory, supra note 7, at 336. 
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artificial entity that was promoted by concession theory, and instead focused 
on the property rights of the underlying shareholders to conceive of the 
corporation as simply an association of individuals.108 Furthermore, “[m]odern 
nexus-of-contracts theory is understood by many to carry on this aggregate 
theory tradition,”109 and shareholder primacy is fairly understood as the 
corporate governance correlate.110 
Importantly, contractarianism eschews government regulation. As Ste-
phen Bainbridge has noted: 
The contractarian model has important implications for a range of cor-
porate law issues, most obviously the debate over the proper role of 
mandatory legal rules. As a positive matter, contractarians contend that 
corporate law is comprised mainly of default rules, from which share-
holders are free to depart, rather than mandatory rules. As a normative 
matter, contractarians think this preference for default rules is just as it 
should be.111 
Thus, because mandatory CSR likely requires meaningful government 
regulation, and aggregate theory is commonly associated with a de-regulatory 
                                                                                                                         
108 Id. 
109 Id. at 337. 
110 Cf. David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 236 n.140 
(1990) (“Advocates of shareholder primacy, while accepting an aggregate theory of the 
corporation, have responded to arguments in favor of broader participation in corporate 
governance by focusing on the unique position that shareholders occupy within the net-
work of contracts.”). It should be noted that all three of the primary theories of corporate 
governance discussed herein routinely claim contractarian roots. Cf. David G. Yosifon, 
The Public Choice Problem in Corporate Law: Corporate Social Responsibility After 
Citizens United, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1197, 1200 (2010) (“In the canonical account, firm di-
rectors are charged with running the firm in the best interests of shareholders not because 
shareholders ‘own’ the corporation, but because shareholder primacy in firm governance is 
the ‘term’ that all of the parties to the corporate nexus would agree to if they actually sat 
around a bargaining table and negotiated with each other.”). 
111 Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 577–78; see also id. at 584 (“One of the chief tenets of 
contractarianism is that the law ought to facilitate private ordering.”). Cf. Larry E. Ribstein, 
Limited Liability and Theories of the Corporation, 50 MD. L. REV. 80, 82, 83 (1991) 
(rejecting “the conception of limited liability as a state-conferred privilege” and explain-
ing that this is important because “recognition of limited liability as the product of private 
ordering compels acceptance of the contract theory of the corporation”); William A. 
Klein, The Modern Business Organization: Bargaining Under Constraints, 91 YALE L.J. 
1521, 1525 (1982) (“[T]his Article rejects the notion that corporate status is a ‘privilege.’ 
It views corporation codes as a device ‘to reduce the transaction costs of private bargain-
ing by providing a code of standard legal arrangements.’”). But see Bainbridge, supra 
note 1, at 585 (“Yet, the law should not always facilitate private ordering. In particular, 
regulatory intervention may be appropriate where there is a market failure. Welfare eco-
nomics classically recognizes four basic sources of market failures: (1) producer monopoly, 
(2) public goods, (3) information asymmetries, and (4) externalities.”). 
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agenda, advocates of mandatory CSR will again need to look elsewhere for 
theoretical support.112 
C. Real/Natural Entity Theory 
As I have previously written: 
The problem with aggregate theory … is that the primary theoretical 
justification for limited liability is the separation of ownership from 
control by way of the statutorily designated overseers of corporate ac-
tivity—the board of directors. If one ignores this separation and boils 
the corporation down to its shareholder owners, then one is essentially 
back to a form of general partnership where all the owners are person-
ally liable for the debts of the business. Thus, the need arose for another 
theory, and real/natural entity theory filled that need by aligning the 
corporation with the board of directors.113 
As opposed to aggregate theory, which essentially boils the corpora-
tion down to an association of shareholders, real entity theory (also known 
as natural entity theory) places the board of directors at the control center 
of the corporation.114 This view is certainly not without its critics,115 but it 
                                                                                                                         
112 Perhaps aggregate theory could support mandatory CSR as a normative matter if it 
(1) denied shareholders the status of owners and (2) viewed the status quo of the share-
holder wealth maximization norm as a function of market failure via regulatory capture 
and the race to the bottom. Cf. Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 547–48. (“[T]he ‘nexus of 
contracts’ or ‘contractarian’ model ... denies that shareholders own the corporation. Instead, it 
argues that shareholders are merely one of many factors of production bound together in 
a complex web of explicit and implicit contracts. Contractarian theory nevertheless 
continues to treat directors and officers as contractual agents of the shareholders, with 
fiduciary obligations to maximize shareholder wealth.”). 
113 Padfield, Rehabilitating Concession Theory, supra note 7, at 337. 
114 Cf. Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 553 (“[J]ust as the law treats the corporation as 
[an] entity for some purposes, the contractarian model should treat the corporation as a 
real entity to the limited extent necessitated by the need for an actual nexus within the 
firm capable of contracting with factors of production.”); id. at 560 (“[T]o the limited 
extent to which the corporation is properly understood as a real entity, it is the board of 
directors that personifies the corporate entity.”); Blair & Stout, supra note 13, at 290 
(“[T]he board of directors is the ultimate decision-making body of the corporation (and in 
a sense is the group most appropriately identified with ‘the corporation’)?….”) (quoting 
Robert C. Clark, Agency Costs versus Fiduciary Duties, PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE 
STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 56 (John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 1985)). 
115 Cf. Padfield, Rehabilitating Concession Theory, supra note 7, at 331 n.17.  
This decision [to equate director primacy and team production theory 
with real entity theory] is controversial at the very least because Ste-
phen Bainbridge, the scholar most commonly associated with director-
primacy theory, rejects the characterization. See [Stefan J. Padfield, The 
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is a useful way of distinguishing shareholder primacy from the director 
primacy and team production models in the corporate personality context, 
since all three claim contractarian and agency roots.116 Regardless, while 
real entity theory arguably provides more support for voluntary CSR than 
aggregate theory (at least when real entity theory is aligned with team 
production theory), it still does not provide the theoretical support advocates 
of mandatory CSR are looking for like concession theory can because it, 
like aggregate theory, casts the corporation as a predominantly private 
actor with essentially all the concomitant rights against regulatory restraint.117 
IV. WHY CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY NEEDS CONCESSION THEORY 
MORE THAN EVER POST CITIZENS UNITED 
Some have argued that corporate personality theory is irrelevant to de-
termining the proper rights and responsibilities of corporations. They point 
to cases where the same personality theory has been used both to embold-
en and restrict corporations.118 What really matters, these critics argue, is 
whether the goals of the relevant statute, for example, are advanced by 
treating corporations one way or another—there is simply no reason to 
always conceive of corporations as artificial entities or aggregates of 
                                                                                                                         
Silent Role of Corporate Theory in the Supreme Court's Campaign Fi-
nance Cases, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 831, 843 n.41 (2013)] (citing “our 
multi-blog post discussions of the issue”). But see id. (“On the other 
hand, Lynn Stout [one of the scholars most commonly associated with 
team-production theory] responded ... with an e-mail asserting that my 
description of the issue was ‘as well put as I’ve seen it.’”). 
Id. 
116 Cf. Padfield, Rehabilitating Concession Theory, supra note 7, at 338 (identifying 
“three versions of real entity theory …: the organic view, the representative view, and the 
pragmatic view”). 
117 Id. at 335. 
118 See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Citizens United and the Corporate Form, 2010 WIS. L. 
REV. 999, 1022–23 (2010) (“In 1926, John Dewey published an article in the Yale Law 
Journal in which he dismisses as irrelevant the debate among the aggregate, artificial 
entity, and real entity views of the corporation. These views, he explains, could be de-
ployed to suit any purpose; and he uses examples relying on the cyclical nature of these 
theories. His conclusion is that theory should be abandoned for an examination of reali-
ty.”) (citing John Dewey, The Historical Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 
YALE L.J. 655, 669, 673 (1926)). But see Horwitz, supra note 101, at 68 (“I wish to 
dispute Dewey’s conclusion that particular conceptions of corporate personality were 
used just as easily to limit as to enhance corporate power. I hope to show that, for exam-
ple, the rise of a natural entity theory of the corporation was a major factor in legitimating 
big business and that none of the other theoretical alternatives could provide as much 
sustenance to newly organized, concentrated enterprise.”). 
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shareholders.119 However, as I have previously argued, the blockbuster 
Citizens United120 case provides a sound basis for concluding that corpo-
rate personality theory still carries great weight—even when, as there, the 
Justices deny it.121 
It may seem counterintuitive to cite a case wherein the majority was si-
lent on the issue of corporate personality theory, and the dissent expressly 
disavowed any role therefor,122 as standing for the proposition that corpo-
rate personality theory matters. However, the academic commentary on 
Citizens United leaves little doubt that corporate personality theory was 
reinvigorated by the case123 and, perhaps more importantly, the opinion gen-
erated intense interest in corporate personality by politicians and voters.124 
                                                                                                                         
119 See Martin Petrin, Reconceptualizing the Theory of the Firm—From Nature to 
Function, 118 PENN ST. L. REV. 1, 43 (2013) (“[A] legal entity should be viewed simply as a 
tool by which the legislature has chosen to enable individuals to pursue certain collective 
(or, in the case of a one-man-company, individual) goals in a more effective and convenient 
manner. Beyond this definition, law—in contrast perhaps to sociology or philosophy—
does not need to assess the nature of the firm.”); Elizabeth Pollman, Reconceiving Corpo-
rate Personhood, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 1629, 1631 (2011) (“[A] metaphor or philosophical 
conception of the corporation is not helpful for the type of functional analysis that the 
Court should conduct. The Court should consider the purpose of the constitutional right at 
issue, and whether it would promote the objectives of that right to provide it to the corpo-
ration—and thereby to the people underlying the corporation.”). 
120 See Padfield, The Silent Role of Corporate Theory in the Supreme Court's Cam-
paign Finance Cases, supra note 7, at 833 (“In Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Commission, a 5-4 majority of the Supreme Court ruled that corporate political speech 
could not be regulated on the basis of corporate status alone.”). 
121 See id. (“Despite protestations to the contrary ... a closer reading of the Citizens 
United opinion reveals that both the majority and dissent not only adopted diverging 
theories of the corporation, but that those theories were likely dispositive.”). A similar 
role for corporate personality theory can be seen in Hobby Lobby, though perhaps at a 
more muted level. See generally Padfield, The Role of Corporate Personality Theory in 
Hobby Lobby, supra note 89 (noting that while Justice Alito’s majority opinion equated 
the closely held corporation with its controlling shareholders, and thus granted the corpo-
ration standing to claim interference with its free exercise rights, Justice Ginsburg argued 
in dissent that the corporation could not, as an artificial entity, exercise religion). 
122 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 971 n.72 (2010) (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (“Nothing in this analysis turns on 
whether the corporation is conceptualized as a grantee of a state concession, ... a nexus of 
explicit and implicit contracts, ... a mediated hierarchy of stakeholders,...or any other 
recognized model.” (internal citations omitted)). 
123 See Stephen Bainbridge, Citizens United v. FEC: Stevens' Pernicious Version of 
the Concession Theory, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (Jan. 21, 2010, 4:05 PM), http:// 
www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2010/01/citizens-united-v-fec-
stevens-pernicious-version-of-the-concession-theory.html. 
124  See Ronald J. Colombo, The Corporation as a Tocquevillian Association, 85 
TEMP. L. REV. 1, 25 n.180 (2012) (“[S]ome in Congress have pushed for legislation that 
would purportedly circumvent Citizens United, and some have even called for a constitu-
tional amendment to reverse the decision.”). Cf. Blair & Stout, supra note 13, at 303 n.13 
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In particular, David Yosifon has argued that even if one did not favor 
some type of mandatory CSR pre-Citizens United, that case should cause 
some reconsideration of that position: 
[I]f we cannot as a matter of constitutional law keep corporations out of 
our democracy, then we must as a matter of corporate law have more de-
mocracy in our corporations. After Citizens United, we must begin to 
restructure corporate law to require boards of directors to actively attend to 
the interests of multiple stakeholders at the level of firm governance.125 
This is so, according to Yosifon, because combining a shareholder 
wealth maximization norm with unfettered political speech rights virtually 
guarantees maximizing the negative externalities created by corporations. 
Yosifon describes the relevant process as follows: 
[C]onventional corporate theory does recognize that because of their 
relative power, firms can sometimes overreach with respect to non-
shareholders by manipulating wages, prices, and perceptions. Even 
where such problems emerge, however, the standard account insists 
that the solution does not reside in altering the shareholder primacy 
norm at the heart of firm governance. Instead, firms should be re-
strained from engaging in such exploitative conduct by external gov-
ernmental regulation, such as labor laws, consumer protection statutes, 
and environmental codes…. But corporations, in general, enjoy com-
petitive advantages over consumers and workers in the competition for 
regulatory favor.... Therefore, it is illogical to expect that “regulation”?
will be able to contain the excesses of the shareholder primacy corpora-
tion. Defenders of shareholder primacy in firm governance rarely ad-
dress the public choice problem directly, but when they do, they voice a 
position similar to that of liberal critics of corporations—they claim 
that the proper response to the problem is to insulate the political and 
regulatory realms from corporate influence. But conservative and criti-
cal corporate scholars have failed to bring corporate theory together 
with free speech analysis and have failed to recognize that the First 
Amendment, and the values it represents, forecloses the kind of regula-
tion that would be necessary to insulate politics from corporate influ-
ence and vindicate shareholder primacy.126 
                                                                                                                         
(“[P]ublic opinion, which ultimately makes law, has made and is today making substan-
tial strides in the direction of a view of the business corporation as an economic institu-
tion which has a social service as well as a profit-making function.”) (quoting E. Merrick 
Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1146–
48 (1932)); id. at 325, n.202 (“[U]nder a mediating hierarchy system, team members’?
rewards from team production will be in part determined by political power.”). 
125 David G. Yosifon, The Public Choice Problem in Corporate Law: Corporate So-
cial Responsibility After Citizens United, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1197, 1197 (2010). 
126 Id. at 1200–04. Shortly before this Essay went to print, a series of papers were pub-
lished advancing these arguments further. See Leo E. Strine & Nicholas Walter, Conservative 
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Thus, to whatever extent concession theory may have been marginal-
ized pre-Citizens United, it is now once again arguably relevant due to it 
being the best suited among the corporate governance and personality theo-
ries to support a movement to rein in the negative externalities flowing 
from Citizens United as described by Yosifon, either directly via legisla-
tive attempts to overturn at least some portion of the opinion, or indirectly via 
legislative mandates for increased corporate accountability to stakeholders. 
V. CRITICISMS 
There should be no doubt that imposing mandatory consideration of 
stakeholders on directors in carrying out their oversight responsibilities 
carries meaningful risk of undermining the wealth creation and innovation 
benefits of the corporate form as currently constituted.127 This general 
                                                                                                                         
Collision Course?: The Tension Between Conservative Corporate Law Theory and Citi-
zens United (Harv. Law Sch. John M. Olin Ctr. Discussion Paper No. 788, Aug. 2014), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2481061 (“Citizens United … undercuts conservative 
corporate theory’s reliance upon regulation as an answer to corporate externality risk, and 
strengthens the argument of its rival theory that corporate managers must consider the 
best interests of employees, consumers, communities, the environment, and society—and 
not just stockholders—when making business decisions.”); Stephen M. Bainbridge, 
Corporate Social Responsibility in the Night Watchman State: A Comment on Strine & 
Walker (UCLA Sch. of Law, Law-Econ Research Paper No. 14-12, Sept. 2014), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2494003 (“This essay argues that Strine and Walker’s analysis 
is flawed in three major respects.”); David G. Yosifon, The Citizens United Gambit in 
Corporate Theory: A Reply to Bainbridge on Strine and Walter (Santa Clara Univ. Legal 
Studies Research Paper No. 4-14, Oct. 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract 
=2510967 (“In this brief essay, I criticize Bainbridge’s critique, and argue that the Citi-
zens United gambit in corporate theory is indeed a compelling challenge to shareholder 
primacy theory.”). 
127 See D. Gordon Smith, Response: The Dystopian Potential of Corporate Law, 57 
EMORY L.J. 985, 1008 (2008) (“The inevitable result would be an increase in the cost of 
public equity capital that, in turn, might prompt many companies to search for a more 
hospitable host for incorporation.”). But cf. Robert Ashford, A Socio-Economic Perspec-
tive on the Theory of the Corporation, the Duties of Corporate Fiduciaries, and the 
Power of the State [working title], 11 (draft of July 4, 2014, on file with author) (noting 
that “[w]hen engaging in corporate planning, corporate fiduciaries must generally deline-
ate time horizons in connection with particular corporate plans” but arguing that when they 
do so “their obligation is to maximize corporate wealth, not shareholder wealth (which 
generally is dependent on factors distinct from the perpetual corporate interests)”). 
Even shareholders who have no present intention of selling their shares 
(and who may therefore be said to have a time horizon identical to the 
corporation) may at any time come across a better investment oppor-
tunity. Selecting a time horizon for corporate wealth-maximization with 
the intent of maximizing the particular wealth of any group of share-
holders would risk failing to maximize wealth for (and therefore do 
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criticism has been well vetted elsewhere, and I will not rehash the debate 
here, though my declining to do so should not be construed as my being 
dismissive of relevant concerns regarding statism.128 However, I would 
like to address a more recent criticism, which is that to the extent some-
thing like mandatory CSR is desirable, it is far better to experiment with 
such a mandate using alternative entities where the potential costs are 
minimized. Specifically, I am talking here about benefit corporations.129 
At the very least, one response to this claim is that it effectively 
amounts to yet another marginalization of CSR.130 While perhaps more fa-
cially impressive than permissive constituency statutes, relegating CSR to 
specifically designated “social enterprise”? forms leaves the vast majority 
                                                                                                                         
economic injustice to) others. There is no stable, unchanging aggregate 
of shareholders with a discernible, homogenous time horizon for which 
wealth can be maximized at every point in time … no stable group of 
shareholders to which corporate wealth-maximizing fiduciary duties 
can be held to run. 
Id. 
128 See, e.g., Harry G. Hutchison, Choice, Progressive Values, and Corporate Law: A 
Reply to Greenfield, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 437, 438 (2010) (“[P]rivate decision making ... 
typically results in better outcomes than ... public/regulatory decision making ... [and] 
effort[s] to diminish respect for choice and liberty of contract correlates with paternalistic 
efforts to enlarge the power of government ... [which] risks government failure as well as 
the sub-ordination of more citizens.”). 
129 See generally J. Haskell Murray & Edward I. Hwang, Purpose with Profit: Gov-
ernance, Enforcement, Capital-Raising and Capital-Locking in Low-Profit Limited 
Liability Companies, 66 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 23 (2011) (“Many social entrepreneurs 
believe that their fourth-sector enterprises need to be seen as entirely unique charitable 
and capitalistic entities, to be differentiated from nonprofits, which are perceived to be 
less efficient than for-profits, and to be differentiated from for-profits, which are fixated 
primarily on financial value.”). Cf. Ian Kanig, Note, Sustainable Capitalism Through the 
Benefit Corporation: Enforcing the Procedural Duty of Consideration to Protect Non-
Shareholder Interests, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 863 (2013). 
Critics, however, question the substantive enforcement mechanism of 
the benefit corporation, a third-party auditing standard that they self-
apply to evaluate whether they are effectively providing for the public 
good. This Note concurs, but proposes a statutory construction and liti-
gation strategy that courts and plaintiffs can apply to ensure that benefit 
corporations do not shirk their duty to the public. Through the express 
private right of action known as the “benefit enforcement proceeding,” 
this Note contends that shareholders and dissenting directors can and 
should seek injunctive relief for breaches of the procedural “duty of 
consideration of non-shareholder interests” by the corporation and its 
board of directors. 
Id. 
130 Cf. Amelia Young, CSR is being marginalized, FINANCIAL POST (last updated 
Jan. 5, 2009, 2:03 PM), http://www.financialpost.com/being+marginalized/1096752/story 
.html?__federated=1 (“CSR is here to stay; however, the face of it needs to evolve from 
being a niche discipline to a core element of sound business practice.”). 
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of the most important entities free to continue placing shareholder wealth 
ahead of social responsibility. Thus, accepting a benefit corporation limita-
tion on mandatory CSR could amount to creating CSR “ghettos”? in the 
vast economic landscape.131 
CONCLUSION 
The three primary models of corporate governance are director primacy, 
shareholder primacy, and team production theory. While successful to 
varying degrees in accurately describing some portion of the current state 
of actual affairs, as well as advancing at least defensible normative posi-
tions, none of them respond to the needs of those who would advocate for 
corporate social responsibility in the form of mandatory provisions such as 
constituency statutes that are enforceable by stakeholders. Rather, such 
advocates must look elsewhere, and this Essay has argued that corporate 
personality theory, particularly concession theory, may provide a strong 
foundation from which to advance the goal of more socially responsible 
corporations. In addition, David Yosifon has noted that challenges to the 
shareholder wealth maximization norm have been absent from what oth-
erwise were significant corporate governance reforms in the forms of 
Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank, at least in part because of the lack of 
any compelling narrative to support a shift away from shareholder wealth 
maximization.132 Concession theory may well provide the needed narra-
tive to overcome the hegemony of shareholder wealth maximization and 
the theories of corporate governance that dominate the current debate to 
the exclusion of enforceable corporate social responsibility norms. 
 
                                                                                                                         
131 Cf. Brian Walker, Don't Bother with the "Green" Consumer, HARV. BUS. REV. 
(Jan. 23, 2008, 9:00 AM), http://www.hbrgreen.org/2008/01/dont_bother_with_the_green 
_con.html (“Small, streamlined green brands that truly appeal to the environmentalist consumer 
can’t reach the mainstream. Those companies get stuck in a green ghetto—virtuous, but 
limited in scope.”). 
132 DAVID YOSIFON, The Corporate Paradox, THE CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
PODCAST (Jan. 28, 2014) (downloaded using iTunes). 
